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I. Introduction 
Technology is a practically indispensible means for satisfying one’s basic interests in 
all central areas of human life including nutrition, habitation, health care, entertainment, 
transportation, and social interaction.1
                                               
1 We may distinguish between welfare interests and ulterior interests.  Welfare interests are those interests which 
are assumed to be had by any person, such as freedom of movement, ownership of property, life, health, etc.  
Ulterior interests are related the specific goals of individuals, such as the desire to own a motorboat, to travel to 
Hawaii, to start an organic farm, etc.  See Feinberg (1984). 
  It is impossible for any one person, even a well-
trained scientist or engineer, to know enough about how technology works in these different 
areas to make a calculated choice about whether to rely on the vast majority of the 
technologies (s)he in fact relies upon.  Yet there are substantial risks, uncertainties and 
unforeseen practical consequences associated with the use of technological artifacts and 
systems.  The salience of technological failure (both catastrophic and mundane), as well as 
technology’s sometimes unforeseeable influence on our behavior, makes it relevant to 
wonder whether we are really justified as individuals in our practical reliance on technology.  
Of course, even if we are not justified, we might nonetheless continue in our technological 
reliance, since the alternatives might not be attractive or feasible.  In this chapter I argue that 
a conception of trust in technological artifacts and systems is plausible and helps us 
understand what is at stake philosophically in our reliance on technology.  Such an account 
also helps us understand the relationship between trust and technological risk, and the ethical 
obligations of those who design, manufacture and deploy technological artifacts. 
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First, a terminological remark.  I will use the terms artifact and technological system 
in a non-standard way in this chapter.  By an artifact, I mean a relatively discrete object or 
component part of an object that has been created intentionally for a particular function.  By a 
technological system, I mean a constellation of artifacts that work more or less in conjunction 
with one another and that create or enable some form of activity.  An example of an artifact is 
a washing machine, or a heating element in a washing machine.  An example of a 
technological system is an array of appliances and component parts, appliance repair 
equipment, electrical and water supply lines, drainpipes, electrical outlets, detergents, 
clothing instruction tags and so forth that together make our activity of washing clothes 
possible.  This contrasts with the standard engineering use of the term system as a set of parts 
working together for a given function.  In order to emphasize my non-standard use, I will use 
technological system instead of system by itself. 
I begin, in this and the next section, with an explanation and justification of the very 
idea of trust in technology.  It is not an idea widely accepted among mainstream philosophers 
of trust, despite recent interest in the topic among theorists of technology.2  Philosophers 
often distinguish between judgments of reliability on the one hand and genuine trust on the 
other, pointing out essential differences between these two attitudes.3
                                               
2 Recent special issues of Knowledge, Technology and Policy and Ethics and Information Technology are 
devoted to trust in technology (Taddeo 2010). 
  Whereas a judgment of 
reliability consists of a purely predictive expectation of performance, trust consists of a 
normative or moral expectation of performance, perhaps associated with characteristic moral 
“reactive attitudes” such as betrayal, blame and resentment.  Technological artifacts are 
mentioned as paradigmatic examples of things about which we make judgments of reliability 
rather than things we can genuinely trust: “In cases where we trust and are let down, we do 
not just feel disappointed, as we would if a machine let us down.  We feel betrayed” (Holton 
3 People often contrast trust with mere reliance,but this is not a suitable comparison.  Reliance is way of acting, 
whereas trust is an attitude.  For our comparison we must therefore find an attitude associated with “mere” acts 
of reliance — here I call this a judgment of reliability. 
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1994, 66).  Another prominent philosopher of trust writes: “Trusting is not an attitude that we 
can adopt toward machinery.  I can rely on my computer not to destroy important documents 
or on my old car to get me from A to B, but my old car is reliable rather than trustworthy.  
One can only trust things that have wills…” (Jones 1996, 14).  On this view, although we 
sometimes use the word ‘trust’ to describe our reliance on technology, this is just a relaxed 
manner of speaking.  Genuine trust is an evaluatively rich interpersonal attitude concerning 
the motives of the trusted person, but reliance is different.  It is as if in one’s reliance on 
technology, one couples a judgment of the means available for achieving one’s ends with the 
engineers’ definition of reliability: “The probability that an item will perform a required 
function without failure under stated conditions for a stated period of time” (O’Connor et al. 
2002, 2).  It seems that the burden of proof falls on one who wants to show that there is an 
interesting sense in which we can trust technological artifacts going beyond this conception 
(see Nickel et al. 2010).  
There is one obvious strategy available for showing that trust in technology is 
something more than a mere reliability judgment.  It has sometimes been suggested that 
genuine trust in an artifact is possible so long as one thinks of it as having as its implicit 
object the people and institutions responsible for the creation and maintenance of the artifact.  
For example, when I trust a bridge not to crumble as I cross it, the real object of my trust is 
those who built the bridge and those who are administratively responsible for its maintenance 
(Origgi 2008, 12).  In this way we do not have to countenance artifacts as free-standing 
objects of trust, because we can explain trust in artifacts as a kind of trust in persons.  Trust in 
a bridge reduces to or is fully explained in terms of trust in those who are responsible for 
creating and maintaining the bridge.  My trust that my Honda will start is to be explained in 
terms of my implicit attitude toward the Honda Motor Company and its employees. 
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This strategy cannot fully explain the idea of trust in artifacts, however.  For when I 
turn the ignition of my car, I rely on the firing of the ignition system, not the creation of a car 
that has an ignition system that fires.  The firing of the ignition system is not an action 
performed by the employees of the Honda Motor Company, nor would we normally say that 
these employees caused my car to start.  It is instead an event caused by the artifact they 
created, and it is this event that I rely upon.  The following principle seems evident: 
(TR)  If I trust some entity E to perform in a particular way, then it must be a salient 
possibility that I (or somebody I care about) could rely on E to perform in that 
way.   
 
Since I do not rely on the employees of the Honda Motor Company to cause the ignition 
system to fire, it follows that I do not trust them to do so.  The entity I trust for this 
performance must be the car itself.  To understand trust in technology we must therefore look 
at the question of whether I can trust an artifact itself.   
I will argue for an account of trust, the Entitlement Account, that makes sense of 
direct trust in artifacts.  The basic idea is that in trusting, we exhibit a willingness to rely for 
something we value on the performance φ of some entity (such as a person, artifact, or 
system) about which we are committed to saying both that (a) it is worth relying on φ; and (b) 
we are entitled to rely on φ.  The attitude of entitlement is a normative expectation about the 
performance of the entity, to be explicated in the next section.   
This account explicates a core attitude common to several kinds of trust including 
institutional trust, self-trust (both mental and bodily), and trust in artifacts.  Although 
applying this account in detail to self-trust and institutional trust would lead us too far away 
from the purpose of this chapter, a brief example is useful to indicate the broader theme.  
Consider how I trust my memory.  Normally, when I make plans today, I trust my own future 
memory faculties to guide my planned action.  If my memory fails, I am likely to feel 
frustrated or disappointed in a way that reveals an attitude of entitlement to the performance 
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of my own faculties.  This feeling of frustration goes beyond what could be explained by a 
mere judgment of reliability (summed up in the idea that it is worth it to rely on my memory), 
although this is also a component of self-trust.  It exhibits a normative dimension.  In the next 
section I will develop an argument along these lines concerning trust in technology. 
 
II. Technological Trust and Entitlement to Performance 
The first element of trust in a technology T is that T is likely enough to perform in 
some desired way φ, compared with other alternatives, that it is worth staking something of 
value on φ.  Without some such attitude, it is hard to explain why a person is disposed to act 
in a way that presupposes or counts on the performance.  But this first element by itself is not 
sufficient for trust, for in trust one also has a normative attitude toward the entity trusted.  
Thus we need a second element in any account of trust in technology, an attitude of 
entitlement to the technology’s performance.  In this section I wish to make it plausible that 
such an attitude exists and that we can make some sense of it folk-psychologically.  I do not 
aim here to show that it is legitimate in the deepest sense.  Plausible attitude-ascription does 
not depend upon the ultimate legitimacy of those attitudes.  For example, philosophers who 
argue that attitudes of blame are illegitimate on the ground that there is no such thing as 
freedom of the will, and hence that there is no suitable object of blame, do not thereby infer 
that blame does not exist. 
To show that an attitude exists, the central step is to show that it explains a cluster of 
phenomenological and psychological observations by providing a rationale for those 
observations, and can be given a plausible description in itself.  In the case of our reliance on 
technology, there are some ordinary phenomena that cannot easily be explained without 
supposing the existence of an artifact-directed entitlement-attitude.  This becomes apparent 
when we focus on negative attitudes toward technological failure such as anger, 
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disappointment, and frustration.  All of these negative attitudes can take an artifact or 
technological system as their object.  An academic survey article on anger’s role in human 
development states that it “ is associated with infants’ attempts to master the physical 
environment, and … elicits behavioral strategies from infants that serve regulatory functions 
and contribute to problem solving” (Lemerise and Dodge 2000, 596).  Technological artifacts 
and systems form a large part of the physical environment throughout human development.  
This is why a car that won’t start or a computer that won’t print the last chapter of one’s 
dissertation can elicit anger.4
What is the rationale for such attitudes?  If the only attitude we ever took toward an 
artifact or technological system were that it is sufficiently likely to perform in a certain way 
that it makes sense to rely upon that performance, there would be no rationale for artifact-
directed disappointment or anger.  For first of all, it is logically consistent with this judgment 
that the artifact or system does not in fact perform.  The judgment at the core of my original 
attitude has not been straightforwardly contradicted by later events, since likelihood and non-
occurrence are not strictly opposed.  At most, if an event judged likely does not occur this 
requires some revision of one’s later judgements of likelihood, and an adjustment of one’s 
plans.  In itself, it seems implausible that a “cold” epistemological attitude such as prediction 
would generate object-directed disappointment or even anger when it failed.  If anything, its 
failure should generate other epistemic or intellectual attitudes such as curiosity or 
puzzlement.  Therefore, in order to explain artifact-directed anger and disappointment, it is 
useful to suppose that people sometimes have a richer normative attitude toward artifacts 
  Frustration and disappointment at the artifact are also common 
(as indicated by Holton in the passage quoted above, op cit.).  These attitudes are distinct 
from (though compatible with) disappointment in an outcome, anger at oneself, and anger at 
those who created an artifact. 
                                               
4 Or even aggression: destruction of objects is a clinical criterion for hostile aggression, although this is often a 
surrogate for interpersonal aggression (Ramírez and Andreu 2006).   
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when they rely on them.  I propose an attitude of entitlement, with the artifact’s performance 
as its object. 
This key notion, entitlement, has two established philosophical meanings.  In one 
sense, it refers to the positive normative status of an attitudinal state, such that one cannot, 
other things equal, be criticized for having that attitudinal state.  For example, some 
epistemologists think we are entitled to the belief that physical objects exist, even though 
they also hold that we have no ultimate justification for this belief since there are no sound 
arguments conclusively establishing its truth.  We cannot be criticized for holding the belief, 
for it provides support to many other beliefs that are themselves confirmed by experience, 
consistent with further beliefs we possess, and useful or even indispensible to our lives 
(Wright 2004).   
Second, entitlement is sometimes understood as a right to goods or services from 
another person.  For example, I might be entitled to three apples belonging to another person 
in virtue of having won a bet with that person.  In this sense an entitlement is a Hohfeldian 
“claim right,” consisting of a liberty to receive these apples together with an obligation the 
other person has to provide me with them (Wenar 2008).  In the case where I come across 
apples not belonging to anybody, my claim right to pick them is a negative right: it consists 
of a liberty to take them, together with an obligation that others not interfere with my doing 
so.   
It is sometimes assumed that the idea of an entitlement to an artifact’s performance 
must fall into either the epistemic type or the rights type: entitlement is either the warrant for 
a belief about what I can reasonably predict of the artifact, or it is a claim right implicitly 
directed toward a person or persons responsible for ensuring that it performs a certain way 
(Franssen 2009).  For example, my entitlement to my car’s starting is understood either as an 
epistemic prediction about the car’s starting, or as a claim right according to which “I can 
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hold the manufacturer, or, in the case of a second-hand car, the car dealer, to his or her part of 
a deal we made” (ibid., 941).  I wish to deny this.  The notion of entitlement I wish to 
elucidate is identical neither with an epistemic entitlement, nor with a claim right, even 
though it has something in common with each.  With the epistemic notion of entitlement it 
shares the feature that one counts upon a performance (here both practically and 
epistemically) the likelihood of which cannot be given a conclusive justification.  Although 
on many given occasions one can question or demand justification for one’s reliance on a 
technological artifact, or refuse to use the artifact because such justification cannot be found, 
in our civilization it would be impossible to do this in general without foregoing the normal 
pursuit of one’s interests.  Wittgenstein (1969) made a case that doubt, as well as demands for 
justification, can only be pursued in everyday life against a backdrop of confident but 
unjustified belief.  Similarly, in a technological age, doubts about technological reliability can 
only be pursued in everyday life against a backdrop of normal, confident reliance.  This 
generates a default practical entitlement to reliance, in the absence of specific reasons for 
doubt.   
The notion of entitlement I have in mind also has something in common with a claim 
right.  First of all, it is normative: it supposes that the entity ought to perform a certain way, 
in an evaluative sense.   Such an entitlement could be justified in a number of ways, drawing 
in the first instance on the fact that the artifact has the function of performing in that way — 
that is what the artifact is for, what it has been created (and probably advertised and sold) to 
do, or what it evolved to do.  This entitlement could then be used in some circumstances to 
justify further normative, moral and legal claims, although it is not identical with those 
claims.  For example, “Failure to φ should be compensated for by the manufacturer,” “Failure 
to φ is a sign of bad design,” “The designer is blameworthy for failure to φ.”  Some of these 
further claims might indicate rights-claims, although they need not do so. 
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This notion of normative, default entitlement is common to many kinds of trust, 
including artifactual trust, self-trust and institutional trust.  Here are some examples.   
(A) A baker prepares dough on Tuesday evening, intending to punch it down and roll it 
out the following afternoon.  The baker takes herself to be entitled on that day to rely 
on her own memory and practical abilities the next day — to complete the action. 
(B) Quoting David Lewis: “In my hometown of Oberlin, Ohio, until recently all local 
telephone calls were cut off without warning after three minutes.  Soon after the 
practice had begun, a convention grew up among Oberlin residents that when a call 
was cut off the original caller would call back while the called party waited” (2002, 
43).  Suppose one’s call is cut off.  In such a situation one takes oneself to be entitled 
to rely on the original caller to call back.5
(C) I work on a manuscript for an entire day and at the end of the day I hit the “save 
document” button in my word processor, planning to open it again the next day.  I 
take myself to be entitled to the document’s latest version being recorded to the hard 
drive. 
 
 
A normal way to express this notion of entitlement is to say that some entity (one’s memory, 
one’s neighbor, one’s computer) is supposed to do something.  It can also be expressed using 
ought or should, where these words are not necessarily taken to express any claim of moral 
obligation or requirement.  I can say, in a normatively rich sense, that I was supposed to 
remember something or that I ought to have remembered it, without supposing that it is my 
moral obligation to remember it. 
 Cases (A)-(C) are not cases in which a person has a claim right to performance, for this 
would suppose wrongly that there is somebody with a duty to provide the performance in 
question, or to refrain from interfering with the performance, in each case.  This would in 
turn license a moral emotion such as blame or betrayal if performance failed — a right of 
moral complaint.  Such a moral emotion would not be appropriate in these cases, because 
there is nobody with such a duty.   Furthermore, although belief-states are involved in these 
cases, the epistemic sense of entitlement is too thin to capture the force of these examples.  
For, first, the issue is what one can depend on in one’s actions, not to what extent one has a 
particular belief.  And second, the normativity associated with epistemic entitlement as I 
                                               
5 This entitlement holds even if one is not oneself the person originally called.  For example, suppose my 
brother was phoned but had to leave suddenly just after the call was cut off, and before the conversation had 
finished.  If I am standing nearby, I am entitled to rely on the original caller’s calling again. 
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explained it above is too weak to account for the attitudes one has about performance.  For in 
these cases one is licensed to be irritated, angry or disappointed at some entity if performance 
fails — in the first case above, at oneself; in the second at the caller; and in the third at the 
computer program.  I am not similarly licensed to be angry or disappointed at some entity in 
the event that some belief in which I am epistemically entitled merely turns out to be false.6  
Furthermore, I am not licensed to be angry or disappointed at just any object for which I stake 
something of value on its behaving a certain way.  For example, I am not licensed to be angry 
or frustrated at a coin that comes down tails when I have bet heads.7
I have said that anger or frustration is a normal response to breakdowns of this type of 
trust.  It is often argued, by contrast, that blame and betrayal are the central negative attitudes 
associated with broken trust (Faulkner  2007; Hieronymi 2008; Holton 1994).  But while 
betrayal and blame have been well-studied in connection with trust,  little attention has been 
paid to normatively-laden emotional responses toward people who act incompetently but 
non-culpably, toward one’s own performance failures, toward institutions that fail, and 
toward artifacts that fail.  In cases of others’ non-culpable failures of competence, 
disappointment can be highly appropriate.  In cases of one’s own failure to perform as 
expected (forgetting, failing to notice something, failing to execute bodily movements 
successfully, etc.), self-directed frustration is very common.  Institutions that fail without the 
known culpable failure of any individual can induce appropriate anger.  Such attitudes are 
pervasive.  Similar reactions toward artifacts also seem appropriate, and although they could 
  My attitude toward the 
coin in such an instance is different than it would be at a coin that failed to register as proper 
currency in a vending machine, for example.  It is the latter attitude that I wish to describe as 
an attitude of entitlement, a kind of normative expectation. 
                                               
6 An exception is the case in which I am told something false by another person.  But in that case I have reason 
to be angry at the person not just because her claim happened to be false but because she wrongly presented the 
claim as true. 
 
7 This point is due to Peter Kroes. 
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also give rise to feelings of blame and betrayal toward the artifact’s designer or manufacturer, 
they are not identical with those feelings. 
Our answer to the question whether technological artifacts can normally be an object 
of anger, say, partly depends on our ability to make sense of an attitude so directed.  Charity 
encourages us to interpret people’s attitudes and behaviors in the way that can be given the 
most rational explication.  This may make it difficult to notice the attitude of entitlement that 
I have placed at the center of trust in technology, because it is easily conflated with a rights 
claim and with the interpersonal attitudes that accompany that claim.  Moral philosophers 
have been reluctant to admit the possibility that object-directed negative attitudes not 
conveying a determinate moral complaint can be appropriate.  In part, I think, this is simply 
because they have not paid sufficient attention to the rich array of such attitudes.  In part it 
may be because prevailing moral theories attempt to vindicate emotions of moral complaint, 
but pay little or no attention to object-directed complaints of other kinds. 
 
III. Trust, Risk and Technological Systems 
Let us define risk as the non-trivial (proper) possibility that a serious negative effect 
will arise in the future, and let us define safety of some process or product as a threshold of 
low risk associated with the process or product such that it is objectively reasonable to accept 
the risk.8
(A) We have conclusive reason to believe that a technological system S is safe (subjective 
certainty that S is safe). 
  What is the relationship between the following claims about safety and trust? 
 
(B) We trust S. 
These two claims are often both true for a given technological system, but neither directly 
implies the other.  On the one hand, even in the case where we think a system like S is a good 
                                               
8 These definitions of risk incorporate value notions such as “serious negative effect” and “reasonable to 
accept.”  For an argument that the notions of risk and safety are fundamentally normative, see the chapter by 
Möller in this volume. 
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idea, and are in a position to rely on S, (A) does not imply (B).  We may have conclusive 
reason to believe that S is safe, but still not trust S.  One reason for this is that safety is not the 
only thing we care about.  We may think there are other technologies that perform better than 
S, or we may think relying on S is not worthwhile given the benefits it produces.  
More interesting is the question whether (B) implies (A).  Normally it is true that 
when I trust a technological system I regard it as safe, i.e. objectively reasonable to accept the 
risks it poses.  But the notion of ‘objectively reasonable’, and thus the notion of safety as I 
have defined it, seems to be based on a situation in which one has more than one good option.  
(A system does not become safe just because there are few alternatives to it, after all.)  Trust, 
on the other hand, might seem somewhat more adaptable to situations in which there are few 
options.  In cases where I do not have many good options besides S and S falls short of 
safety, we might still want to say that I choose willingly to rely on S, and that I have 
normative expectations about S’s performance, and thus that I trust S.  We are of two minds 
about the relation between willingness and good options.   In one sense, when I hand my 
wallet to an armed robber, this is voluntary, since I choose that action over likely injury or 
death.  In another sense, I act involuntarily because I have no other reasonable option.9
This difficulty sometimes arises when a new technological system comes into being 
that completely replaces an old way of pursuing an activity, leaving no easy way to opt out of 
reliance.  For example, a card-based system for gaining access to public transportation might 
be introduced, or a nuclear power plant might be located near one’s long-time place of 
residence.  Suppose I have my doubts about whether these systems are safe (or secure): I feel 
they may present significant risks to my privacy or life, respectively.  Although the question 
of whether I feel trust toward these systems may still be in order, my disposition to rely on 
the systems is difficult to assess.   I may have little choice but to rely on the system, therefore 
 
                                               
9 This issue is famously discussed by Aristotle, who already sensed the difficulty of settling it in book III of his 
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1998).  Aristotle himself calls coerced actions voluntary because their immediate 
cause lies in the person who acts. 
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in one sense I am so disposed.  But I may remain (somewhat) against doing so, were I to have 
a fully adequate choice in the matter.  In that case, my trust or distrust has no immediate 
practical point, but merely registers my feelings, gesturing indistinctly toward some 
hypothetical situation in which I might be in a position to choose. 
Some contexts like this, in which people rely on pervasive technological systems and 
where doing so would be difficult to avoid, have raised prominent questions about trust in the 
academic literature.  Examples are electronic voting systems (Pieters 2006), electronic patient 
dossiers (Barrows and Clayton 1996), large-scale energy projects (Viklund 2003), and GMO 
foods (Frewer et al. 2003).  For example, a recent paper describes trust attitudes toward a new 
system for e-voting in the United Arab Emirates (Salem 2007).  As described in the paper, in 
the UAE there is no election law, and voting is carried out by an electoral college of several 
thousand citizens appointed by the rulers’ courts.  The electoral college is more than four-
fifths male.  In this context, an electronic voting system has been introduced including an 
electronic system for the registration of electors and candidates, a system for verifying the 
identity of electors, and a vote casting system with kiosks, a voting database, an encryption 
system, and a vote counting and results-presentation system.  Considering the question of 
trust and how to enhance it through “knowledge management,” the author observes that 
“Perhaps, the clearest indicator of voter trust and satisfaction with the system” is that the 
electoral authorities received no requests for a recount and that there were no recorded 
incidents of voter fraud (ibid., 9).  The question of how citizens who were not allowed to vote 
felt about this technological system is not addressed.  
Unless citizens wish to leave the UAE, the existing voting system and its 
technological realization is a fact of life for them, completely embedded in the emerging 
machinery of democracy there.  It is unclear what meaning we should assign to trust in this 
context.  If we ask whether people trust the system, are we asking whether they acquiesce in a 
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system that poses uncertain risks, that currently violates international norms of democratic 
political representation, and that they can hardly avoid?  Or whether if they were free to 
choose this system or another available alternative, they would actually be disposed to choose 
it and would feel entitled to a certain (safe, secure, fair, privacy-respecting) performance from 
the system?   The former is a practically salient question, but has little to do with trust, since 
an affirmative answer is compatible with complacent or even grudging tolerance, and a high 
perception of risk.  The latter is not as practically salient, but asks a question more in line 
with the willingness we associate with trust, one that has greater ethical relevance to the 
legitimacy of the voting system, and one that tracks perceptions of safety.  It may only be 
practically relevant to ask this latter question with regard to those instances of reliance on 
technological systems where one comes close to having a free choice, such as whether to use 
the Internet (or a particular website) to find health information (e.g., Vedder 2003).  It is 
usually asked against a backdrop of widespread and largely unquestioned reliance on existing 
technological systems and the artifacts that comprise them, singling out one element for 
assessment.  If this is how we understand questions about trust in technological systems, a 
conceptual connection between trust and perception of safety is maintained.  Trust in a 
technological system implies imputing a level of safety to that system that one would be 
willing to accept given a real choice (assuming that the other condition, the normative 
expectation of a certain performance, is also met). 
 
IV. The Ethics of Trust and Technology 
 In this final section I discuss the ethics of trust and technology, an area in which 
ethics and epistemology are closely linked.  On the one hand, the ethics of trust requires an 
ethics of belief.  Trust centrally involves doxastic states regarding expected future events.  It 
is partly an estimation that some future event is likely enough to be worth relying upon.  But 
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trust is also practical; it inherently disposes one toward the act of reliance, even if the 
opportunity to do so is not always present.  Because of its practical dimension, the ethics of 
trust is not a pure ethics of belief (if there is such a thing).  A person’s decision to rely on a 
given technological artifact or system is influenced by pragmatic factors, such as what 
alternatives are available (if any), the time it would take to research these alternatives, the 
benefits she stands to gain if the artifact or system performs as expected, and so on.  These 
pragmatic factors may also affect what she expects from the technology normatively, what 
she feels entitled to from the technology.  Furthermore, the person who relies on technology 
is rarely in a perfectly free and epistemologically privileged position.  She must rely on 
technology under conditions of time pressure, insufficient cognitive resources, and without 
full information.  
In my view, a person’s epistemological and practical condition is improved when she 
has adequate, sound justification for her trust, going beyond the mere entitlement discussed in 
section II.  I will call this the justified trust ethic.  It is a particular application of a plausible 
minimal rationalist principle which states that in making important decisions it is best to do 
so on the basis of adequate reasons.  On my account of what trust in technology is, one’s 
justification for it consists in adequate reasons to believe (a) that the technology is 
sufficiently likely to achieve a performance φ that it is worth relying upon it, and (b) that one 
is in fact entitled to φ.  Having the justification consists of having access to these reasons, in 
the sense that one grasps and recognizes the reasons.  Having the justification does not 
require being able to articulate, weigh, or support these reasons with more fundamental 
argument.  That would be too intellectualized a conception of having reasons for trust.  Even 
if the notion of a justification is not hyperintellectualized, however, coming to have a 
justification for one’s trust requires scarce cognitive resources such as attention and short-
term memory.  For this reason, the justified trust ethic must be qualified: coming to have a 
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justification for one’s trust sometimes takes up too much time or demands excessive 
cognitive resources, and must be balanced against other factors. 
There are two serious arguments against the justified trust ethic.  The first is based on 
skepticism about whether most people can actually have an adequate justification for their 
trust.  They stress that most people are incapable of rationally processing relevant information 
about risk, probability and benefit.  For example, people tend to value the elimination of risk 
more highly than the reduction of risk by an equivalent interval (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992, Tversky and Fox 1995).  They evaluate risks differently when probabilistically 
equivalent but notationally different ways of presenting information are used (Carling et al. 
2009).  This and other psychological research suggests that non-experts (and probably experts 
as well, when they are not thinking formally) cannot recognize the reasons that support their 
judgments of risk.  Indeed, it is commonly argued (or just assumed) that trust is an alternative 
to making serious judgments about risk, an easier heuristic that allows one to take risks 
without doing the cognitive work of gathering information oneself and evaluating it.   
Perhaps for these reasons, those who write about trust and technology often 
presuppose that that the designers, manufacturers and deployers of technology have only two 
trust-related tasks: first, to make the technology as reliable as possible at doing the things it is 
supposed to do, where this is understood to include safety — thus to make it trustworthy; and 
second, to persuade possible users that it is sufficiently reliable and safe, thus trustworthy, 
using whatever psychologically effective means are available.  I will call this the 
trustworthiness ethic.  In arguing that one should design for trust, it is sometimes unclear 
whether it is the trustworthiness ethic or the justified trust ethic that predominates, since both 
have as their goal the elicitation of a user or client’s trust in some contexts.10
                                               
10 There is also a more specialized sense of ‘design for trust.’  Vermaas et al. discuss a special case in which the 
item to be designed is itself a trust-facilitating information technology (2010).  
 
17 
 
In addition to the argument that justifying trust is too demanding, a second positive 
argument that might be offered in favor of the trustworthiness ethic, and against the justified 
trust ethic, is that relying on trustworthy technology makes people better off, whereas having 
a further justification for that reliance does not add any additional benefit.  This point is a 
variant of what has been called the “Meno problem” (named after Plato’s dialogue Meno in 
which the problem was first formulated) for the value of justification (Plato 1961; Pritchard 
2008).  The idea is that having a justification for one’s true belief does not make one any 
better off than simply having a true belief.  To use Plato’s example: one may travel to Larissa 
if one has a true belief about which road to take; having a justification for that true belief does 
not get one to Larissa any more effectively. 
Elsewhere, I make a case for the justified trust ethic, claiming that in certain contexts 
it generates an obligation on the part of the designer, manufacturer, or deployer of a 
technology to provide evidence of trustworthiness to people in a position to trust that 
technology.11
                                               
11 Nickel 2011.  I will simply say “designer” and “user” in what follows for the sake of economy. 
  In the remainder of this chapter I will not repeat that argument, but instead 
expand upon it, defending the justified trust ethic against the two objections to it described 
above.  Thus, first, I will argue that there are often kinds of evidence available relevant to the 
components of trust that can plausibly be recognized and grasped by the person in a position 
to trust; and second, that a justification acquired by the person, comprised of this evidence, 
has value for her.  This clears the way to hold that those designing, making, or deploying 
technology to be trusted must both provide sound evidence of trustworthiness, and must not 
provide unsound or irrelevant evidence that could mislead the potential user.   Of course this 
conclusion is only intended to apply to technologies that are plausibly trustworthy given 
certain reasonable aims of the potential user; if the technology is not trustworthy and the 
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designer knows this then there is no question of providing sound evidence for its 
trustworthiness to the user. 
Evidence that it is worth relying on a given technology depends for its specific 
content on the aims, interests, and risk-aversity of the user.  The specific threshold of 
functioning and safety that the user demands for justified reliance is particular to her.  But 
there are general kinds of information that can provide a sound basis for trust, that do not 
require a nuanced understanding of probabilities, uncertainty or statistical reasoning.  I focus 
on two relevant types of evidence: first, evidence that failure to perform will (often) lead to 
an effective sanction.  This makes it clear that it is in the designer’s interest to ensure 
performance.  The effective sanction could consist of a punishment, reputational damage, or 
loss of future opportunities.  The evidence need only draw attention to the institutional 
structures that make such sanctions possible, not to the possibility of specific performance-
failures.  The second type of evidence consists of an indication that other parties, independent 
of the designer, and sharing the values of the user, are willing to stake their reputations on the 
technology’s performance.  These two types of evidence are sound reasons for trust because 
they indicate why the designer has a strong interest in serving the interests of the user.  They 
relate both to the likelihood that the technology will perform a certain way, as well as the 
basis for the user’s perceived entitlement to that performance.  Russell Hardin describes this 
as “encapsulation of interests” and thinks of it as the paradigmatic reason for taking the 
attitude of trust (Hardin 2006).  Some social scientific accounts of the reasons of trust, 
emphasizing reputational and institutional factors, support this view (Coleman 1990; Pettit 
1995). 
It is highly plausible that in some cases sound information of these types could be 
made available to the user, and that the user could recognize it as such. Neither form of 
information depends on difficult, psychologically unreliable forms of probabilistic reasoning. 
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For example, the user can be shown that an artifact is certified by a governmental authority 
with the power to sanction failures of performance.  At the same time, the second component 
of trust in technology, the normative expectation, can provide a focal point for 
communication about what (level of) performance the user should expect.  Instead of leaving 
this implicit, designers can make it clear to the user that certain obvious aspects of 
performance such as safety and privacy meet established public norms, and it can be made 
clear to the user what the technology is (and is not) designed to do. 
However, so long as a given technology is in fact trustworthy, one might wonder in 
what way it matters how the designer convinces potential users of this fact.  Or to put the 
point in terms of the user’s point of view: so long as she has a true belief that the technology 
is trustworthy, why is it important that she has access to sound reasons for this belief?  One 
crucial reason is that offered by Plato himself in response to the Meno problem: beliefs held 
without reason or held on the basis of unsound reasons are brittle, insufficiently “tied down” 
to ensure a stable attitude.  Suppose I decide to join a social networking Internet site, and my 
reason for trusting the site to keep details about my telephone number, relationship status and 
political affiliation private is merely that my friends use it regularly and seem to have no such 
problems.   Suppose later one of my friends reports that her private details were made visible 
to the general public, in just the way I hope to avoid happening in my own case.  Suppose 
that, unknown to me, this happened because my friend made a culpable mistake, but she tells 
me it is because of a design flaw in the software.  If my only reason for believing that the site 
will keep my details private is the experience of my friends, then at this point my trust may 
vanish — but if my trust were (also) based on an awareness that an independent body verifies 
that the site meets established privacy standards, then I might think twice before abandoning 
my trust in the site on the basis of my friend’s experience.  Although this is perhaps a trivial 
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case, we can easily imagine similar cases in which the technology in question was a radiation 
treatment for cancer, a boat engine, or a new business data management system.  
A second reason for providing sound evidence of trustworthiness is that doing so 
upholds a principle of respect toward users of technology.  A widely held ethical principle 
holds that when important decisions are to be made, those affected by or making these 
decisions should have the opportunity to give their free, considered consent to the decision, 
using relevant information.  This is known as the Principle of Respect or the Principle of 
Informed Consent.12
In this chapter I have argued for a distinctive philosophical conception of trust in 
artifacts and technological systems.  I have also argued that this conception invites a new 
understanding of our way of relying on the designed environment under conditions of risk, 
and that it allows us to make a distinctive ethical point about technology design.  Much more 
  Although technology users may be limited in their ability to calculate 
risks decision-theoretically, they have what Gigerenzer and others have defended as 
“bounded rationality” (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002), allowing them to make rational 
decisions in many typical contexts.  This suggests that, instead of bypassing or ignoring the 
rational capacities of technology users, it is better to target information to their abilities.  
Furthermore, some users of advanced technological systems or stakeholders in their use have 
a better than average ability to make rational judgments about technical reliability and have 
more knowledge than average about reasonable norms of performance that apply to a given 
technology.  They deserve to have a reasonable opportunity to form a well-grounded attitude 
of trust or distrust supplemented by evidence about the interests of the technology’s 
designers. 
                                               
12 The principle of informed consent is best known from the domains of research ethics and medical ethics 
(National Commission 1979).  My suggestion here differs from the usual application of the principle of 
informed consent in three ways: first, I am not suggesting that it be thought of primarily as an institutional or 
legal norm; second, I am applying it to any technological artifact or system that has significant possible impacts 
for the user, where the user is in a position to choose that technology; and third, I am applying it to the reasons 
for trust, rather than to the risks and benefits associated with the technology itself.  (In the usual application of 
the principle, the technology in question would be a research protocol or a medical therapy.) 
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work needs to be done exploring this topic, including some work that is empirical or 
interdisciplinary in nature.  For example, it would be good to have a better grasp of the 
psychological basis on which people develop normative expectations of artifact performance, 
and on how communication affects these expectations.  The framework presented here is an a 
priori starting point for such investigations. 
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